22A: Justice Must Also Be Seen

The controversy over judges’ retirement ages has now reached the Supreme Court itself. Whatever the eventual decision, confidence in the process matters almost as much as the constitutional answer.

There are moments when the familiar maxim that justice must not merely be done but must manifestly be seen to be done becomes considerably more than an attractive quotation.

The controversy surrounding the proposed 22nd Amendment is one of them.

The Bar Association of Sri Lanka has now suggested that Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena should recuse himself from hearing the constitutional challenges to legislation proposing, among other things, to increase the retirement age of Supreme Court judges from 65 to 67 and Court of Appeal judges from 63 to 65.

The sensitivity is obvious.

The Chief Justice is due to retire under the existing constitutional arrangement in December. A change to the retirement age, depending upon its eventual wording and application, therefore raises questions which potentially touch serving members of the judiciary itself.

That does not mean a judge is incapable of deciding a constitutional question impartially merely because its consequences may affect the institution to which he or she belongs. Judges routinely determine matters carrying consequences far beyond the litigants immediately before them.

But this is different enough to demand exceptional care.

Public confidence in the judiciary rests not merely upon actual independence but upon the appearance of independence. That principle protects judges as much as it protects litigants. Recusal should never become a weapon by which parties conveniently select the judges they would prefer. Equally, legitimate questions about apparent conflicts cannot simply be brushed aside because they are inconvenient.

The Government also bears responsibility.

It commands an enormous parliamentary majority. That gives it the constitutional ability to pursue significant reform, but numbers in Parliament are not a substitute for constitutional restraint. Indeed, overwhelming political power creates an even greater obligation to demonstrate that institutions are not being redesigned for the convenience of those presently occupying them.

There may be perfectly respectable arguments for extending judicial retirement ages. People live longer, professional careers have changed and experienced judges represent an enormous investment of institutional knowledge. Other jurisdictions retain senior judges considerably beyond Sri Lanka’s present limits.

Then legislate for the future.

The controversy becomes considerably harder when constitutional change could benefit those already holding the offices whose tenure is being altered.

This is why the Supreme Court proceedings matter far beyond two additional years of judicial service.

Sri Lanka voted overwhelmingly for political change. But genuine change cannot simply mean replacing the people exercising power. It must mean changing the manner in which power is exercised.

Government must be beneath the Constitution. Parliament must be beneath the Constitution. And, however distinguished its members, the judiciary must also operate within the constitutional order it is entrusted to defend.

The Supreme Court will speak on 22A.

When it does, Sri Lanka must have confidence not merely in the answer, but in the process by which that answer was reached.

Be that as it may, the rule of law has one particularly inconvenient characteristic: it works best when nobody – government, Parliament or judge – is permitted to become the exception.