Colombo, 24 January 2026 — Just days after the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) endured what many described as the most humiliating episode in its 130-year history, the Exchange has moved quietly but decisively to address the deeper issues exposed by the events of 7 January. In a development that has gone largely unnoticed outside industry circles, the CSE on 21 January issued a confidential Request for Proposal (RFP) calling for entirely new Broker Back Office (BBO) and Order Management Systems (OMS) to be adopted across member stockbroker firms.
The timing is striking. On 7 January, trading was halted at 9:54 a.m. and all transactions executed earlier that morning were cancelled after unusually high market orders distorted prices and the order book. The decision drew widespread criticism and raised uncomfortable questions about the resilience of the market’s trading infrastructure and the adequacy of risk controls within broker systems. While the public debate focused on whether the halt and reversal were lawful, the RFP suggests the CSE’s internal conclusion was that the problem ran deeper than a single trading decision.
The Colombo Stock Exchange currently runs its market on an electronic Automated Trading System (ATS) alongside a Central Depository System (CDS) that handles clearing, settlement and custody of securities, reflecting decades-old infrastructure designed to automate trading and transaction processing. For brokers and investors connecting to this system, ATrad, developed by IronOne Technologies, has become the dominant trading interface and back-office engine in the Sri Lankan market. Built as an integrated online stock trading and brokerage solution, ATrad enables remote order placement, real-time portfolio views, broker back-office operations and a suite of risk and compliance tools, and today accounts for the vast majority of trade initiations on the CSE. Because so many broker firms rely on this single platform for their front-end trading, risk controls and back-office processing, IronOne holds a de facto monopoly over key software infrastructure that connects market participants to the Exchange — a concentration of technological influence that industry critics argue contributed to systemic weaknesses exposed during the recent market disruption
The document makes clear that stockbroker firms themselves have expressed willingness to change their BBO and OMS platforms over the next five years. That statement is revealing. It signals that frustrations with legacy broker technology were already present and that the events of early January merely exposed weaknesses that had long existed beneath the surface.
What the CSE now demands from vendors reads like a blueprint for preventing a recurrence of that morning’s disruption. The proposed systems must be cloud-based, operate on a SaaS model, deliver 99.99% availability and maintain full redundancy across software, database, network and cloud layers. Each broker system must be capable of handling thousands of orders per day while performing real-time pre-trade risk validation, buying power checks and price validations before orders ever reach the market. Disaster recovery standards are stringent, requiring zero data loss and recovery within an hour. Detailed audit trails must capture user activity, IP addresses and geographic origins of orders, while annual penetration testing and disaster recovery drills are mandatory.
The emphasis on pre-trade risk control is particularly telling. The new OMS platforms must be able to determine trading limits, enforce tick size and price validations, and prevent problematic orders from entering the market. For many market observers, this is the clearest indication that the CSE views the January incident as a failure of upstream broker controls rather than merely a market anomaly.
The RFP also breaks new ground in how the Exchange involves itself in broker technology choices. Historically, brokers were free to select and manage their own internal systems. Under this process, the CSE and the Colombo Stock Brokers Association will jointly evaluate vendors and shortlist acceptable systems, from which brokers must then choose. In effect, the Exchange is setting a minimum technological standard for the entire brokerage industry for the first time.
Another notable feature is the insistence on open API architecture. OMS platforms must be able to connect seamlessly to multiple BBO systems and third-party trading front ends such as Bloomberg and Reuters. This signals a move away from the closed, siloed software environments that have characterized many broker operations for over a decade and which have struggled to integrate modern risk, reporting and compliance requirements.
Although the RFP does not refer directly to the events of 7 January, its technical requirements mirror precisely the vulnerabilities that day revealed: uncontrolled market orders, insufficient system capacity during order surges, inadequate audit visibility and limited real-time risk monitoring. What reads as a procurement specification doubles as a quiet post-mortem translated into technical standards.
The seriousness of the initiative is underlined by strict procurement conditions. Vendors must submit a LKR 1 million bid bond and, if selected, provide a performance bond amounting to five percent of the contract value. Proposals are subject to technical demonstrations, proof-of-concept testing and detailed evaluation by committees appointed by both the CSE and broker association.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the document is its objective. It does not speak of upgrading existing platforms or improving current systems. It speaks of shortlisting entirely new OMS and BBO solutions for brokers to implement in due course. This is, in effect, a five-year technology reset for Sri Lanka’s brokerage industry.
The events of early January may ultimately be remembered not only for the embarrassment they caused but for the transformation they triggered. For the first time, the CSE appears to recognize that broker technology is not merely an internal operational matter but a component of market infrastructure capable of affecting market stability itself. In moving to standardize and modernize these systems, the Exchange is positioning technology, rather than regulation alone, as a primary safeguard of market integrity.
If implemented as envisioned, the RFP issued this week may mark the beginning of the most significant technological modernization of Sri Lanka’s capital market since the introduction of electronic trading.
