The position around the Strait of Hormuz has become materially more dangerous over the past 48 hours.
The immediate concern is no longer merely the threat of closure. It is the growing evidence that commercial shipping is increasingly being drawn into the conflict. India has formally protested attacks affecting vessels carrying Indian nationals, while reports continue to emerge of merchant ships coming under fire or being forced to alter routes. An Indian-linked vessel was among those reported to have encountered hostile action in the Strait, prompting renewed naval vigilance from New Delhi.
Meanwhile, the United States has once again conducted strikes against Iranian targets, reportedly including surveillance, communications and air-defence assets. Iran has responded with attacks against U.S.-aligned targets in the region and continues to use the Strait as a pressure point.
What is remarkable is that despite all this, shipping has not completely stopped. Tankers are still moving through Hormuz, albeit under extraordinary conditions. Some vessels are travelling with tracking systems switched off, others are taking longer routes, and war- risk premiums have risen sharply. Several LNG cargoes have successfully exited the Strait in recent days, demonstrating that the route remains open in a technical sense, but increasingly hazardous in a practical one.
For Sri Lanka, this matters enormously.
Every rise in oil prices, insurance premiums, freight charges and shipping delays eventually finds its way into fuel prices, electricity costs, food inflation and the broader cost of living. Brent crude has already climbed on fears of disruption.
As for President Trump, he is discovering a reality that has humbled almost every major power in modern history.
Starting military action is often easier than ending it.
Trump campaigned heavily on being the man who would end wars, avoid “forever wars” and use leverage to bring adversaries to the negotiating table. Yet the Iran conflict is demonstrating the limits of both military power and personal diplomacy.
He has repeatedly suggested that peace is imminent, only to find the conflict continuing days, weeks and now months later.
The deeper problem is strategic.
Washington can destroy radar stations, missile sites, command centres and other “strategic assets.” What it cannot easily destroy is Iran’s willingness to absorb punishment while continuing resistance. History repeatedly shows that military superiority does not automatically translate into political victory.
In many respects, Trump appears caught between two competing instincts:
* His desire to project strength and decisiveness.
* His promise to avoid another open-ended Middle East war.
Escalate too much and he risks becoming the very interventionist leader he once criticised. Escalate too little and adversaries conclude they can outlast him.
The result is a conflict that appears trapped in a cycle of strikes, retaliation, threats, ceasefires, broken ceasefires and renewed strikes.
Be that as it may, the uncomfortable truth for Trump is that ending a war requires the cooperation of one’s enemies. Thus far, neither Iran nor its allies appear willing to provide him with the quick diplomatic victory he clearly hoped to claim. The battlefield can be managed; the politics of ending the war remain far more elusive
