American strikes expand against Iran as the battle for the world’s energy artery enters a far more dangerous phase
The conflict between the United States and Iran has entered a new and considerably more dangerous phase, with Washington expanding its attacks on Iranian military infrastructure while Tehran retaliates across the Gulf and once again uses the Strait of Hormuz as both a battlefield and an economic weapon.
The latest American operations have reportedly targeted Iranian coastal defences, missile launch and storage sites, air-defence systems, radar installations and other military infrastructure linked to Tehran’s ability to threaten shipping through the Gulf. United States strikes have now extended beyond southern coastal areas to targets near Tehran and in northern Iran, while American forces have also disabled an oil tanker accused of attempting to breach the naval blockade imposed on Iranian ports.
The immediate American objective appears reasonably clear: reduce Iran’s ability to launch missiles and drones, weaken its coastal defences and deny Tehran the military tools required to interfere with commercial shipping. The more difficult question is whether air power alone can achieve that objective without widening the conflict further.
Iran has responded by launching missiles and drones towards American bases and facilities in Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait. Tehran has also warned that attacks on its power network or other national infrastructure could lead to retaliatory action against infrastructure elsewhere in the region.
The threat carries considerable weight in a Gulf crowded with oil terminals, refineries, desalination plants, power stations, ports and American military installations.
At the centre of the confrontation lies the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow maritime passage connecting the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea. Approximately onefifth of globally traded oil and a substantial proportion of the world’s liquefied natural gas ordinarily pass through or near this waterway.
When Hormuz operates normally, it is scarcely noticed beyond the shipping and energy industries. When it does not, almost every economy in the world begins to feel the consequences.
Iran understands this perfectly.
Its ability to threaten, restrict or render the Strait commercially unsafe gives Tehran leverage far beyond the size of its economy. Iran does not necessarily have to sink large numbers of vessels or physically seal every shipping lane. It merely has to create sufficient danger to persuade shipowners, crews, charterers and insurers that the journey is no longer worth the risk.
That process is already under way. Commercial movements through the Strait have fallen sharply, insurance costs have risen and some shipping operations have slowed or halted.
Oil prices have moved above US$85 a barrel amid fears that the disruption could spread beyond Hormuz to the Bab al-Mandeb passage linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Iran has threatened that allied Houthi forces in Yemen could also interfere with that second strategic shipping route should American attacks continue.
That would present the world with an especially severe problem. Hormuz carries much of the Gulf’s energy supply. Bab al-Mandeb provides access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Serious disruption at both points would force more ships around the Cape of Good Hope, adding time, fuel, insurance and freight costs to global trade.
For Sri Lanka, this is not a distant war unfolding between two powerful states.
Sri Lanka imports most of its petroleum requirements and remains highly exposed to changes in international fuel prices, freight rates and foreign-exchange costs. A prolonged disruption would eventually be felt at filling stations, in electricity generation, in airline and shipping charges, in the price of food and in almost every business dependent upon transport.
Higher crude prices do not remain confined to crude oil. They affect diesel used by buses and trucks, fuel used by fishing vessels, aviation costs, fertiliser production, plastics, packaging, manufacturing and the cost of moving goods from one part of the country to another.
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Shipping disruption also raises the cost of imported medicine, machinery, raw materials and consumer goods. The first economic blow would therefore arrive through fuel. The second would arrive through freight. The third would arrive through inflation.
The crisis also demonstrates the limits of military control over a strategic waterway. The United States possesses overwhelming air and naval power, but keeping Hormuz open is not simply a matter of declaring control over it.
Iran retains missiles, drones, fast attack craft, mines and coastal systems capable of making commercial passage extraordinarily dangerous.
Analysts have warned that permanently securing the Strait could require continuous naval escorts, extensive surveillance and perhaps a far larger military commitment than Washington has so far contemplated.
This is where the American strategy becomes more complicated. Every strike that destroys an Iranian radar station or missile battery may temporarily reduce Tehran’s capabilities. It may also encourage Iran to retaliate against another military base, tanker, port or Gulf state. Each side is attempting to increase the cost faced by the other, yet neither has demonstrated a convincing path towards ending the confrontation.
There are, nevertheless, faint indications that diplomacy has not disappeared entirely. Iran has released an American-Iranian citizen who had been detained since 2024, a move welcomed by President Donald Trump as a possible gesture of goodwill.
Pakistan and other regional states continue to press for negotiations, even as the attacks intensify.
That gesture should not be overstated. Prisoner releases can open doors, but missiles have an unfortunate habit of closing them rather quickly.
The danger now is that both Washington and Tehran believe escalation will improve their position before negotiations begin. America may calculate that damaging Iran’s military infrastructure will compel Tehran to compromise. Iran may calculate that disrupting the world’s energy supply will force Washington and its allies to retreat.
Both calculations could prove wrong.
A damaged missile site can be rebuilt. A disrupted shipping route can be reopened. Confidence, however, is far more difficult to restore. Shipowners and insurers will not return merely because political leaders announce that the crisis has passed. They will require evidence that vessels, crews and cargoes can move safely through the waterway.
The battle for Hormuz is therefore about much more than who controls several kilometres of sea.
It is about whether Iran can continue using geography as strategic leverage, whether the United States can protect global shipping without becoming trapped in another prolonged regional conflict, and how much economic pain the wider world will endure while the two countries test each other’s resolve.
Be that as it may, the most consequential weapon in this confrontation may not be a missile, drone or warship. It may be the price placed upon every barrel of oil, every insured vessel and every shipment forced to navigate a world in which the shortest route has suddenly become the most dangerous.
