One of the recurring frustrations of governance in Sri Lanka is that just when citizens, investors and institutions become accustomed to a particular set of rules, someone decides the rules should change.’
The latest example is the reported proposal to extend the retirement age of judges serving in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal. At present, Sri Lanka’s Constitution fixes the retirement age of Supreme Court judges at 65 and Court of Appeal judges at 63. These limitshave remained largely unchanged since the 1978 Constitution.
The immediate question is simple. Why?
Governments are entitled to reform institutions. Laws are not sacred texts. Circumstances change. People live longer. Professional expertise remains valuable well beyond traditional retirement ages. Many countries have indeed reviewed retirement ages across both public and private sectors as life expectancy has increased. Britain recently moved its judicial retirement age from 70 to 75 on precisely those grounds.
Yet judicial reform is different from ordinary administrative reform.
The judiciary derives its authority not merely from the law but from public confidence in its independence. Any alteration affecting the tenure of serving judges inevitably raises questions, even if those questions are entirely unfair.
Is the objective to retain experienced judges?
s there a shortage of suitably qualified successors?
Is there a growing backlog of cases that requires the continued service of senior judicial officers?
Or is Sri Lanka simply attempting to align itself with regional norms?
A comparison with the region provides only limited support for the argument. Supreme Court judges in India retire at 65. Pakistan also retires its apex court judges at 65. High Court judges in India retire at 62 while Pakistani High Court judges retire at 62.
In other words, Sri Lanka is not dramatically out of step with its neighbours.
That reality makes the rationale for change even more important.
The Bar Association of Sri Lanka has already expressed concern, arguing that any constitutional amendment affecting judicial retirement ages should not be undertaken casually or in response to short-term considerations. It has warned that repeated constitutional adjustments tailored to immediate circumstances risk creating a dangerous precedent.
Be that as it may, the issue extends beyond judges.
It speaks to a broader national habit.
Tax rules change. Import rules change. Investment rules change. Election laws change. Public servants face shifting retirement ages. Businesses invest based on one framework only to discover another emerging months later.
Stable societies are built on predictable rules. Investors require certainty. Citizens require certainty. Institutions require certainty.
That does not mean rules should never change. It means changes should be rare, carefully justified and transparently explained.
If the Government believes extending judicial retirement ages is necessary, it owes the country a clear explanation. Not because the proposal is automatically wrong, but because public confidence depends upon understanding why fundamental rules are being altered.
Otherwise, Sri Lanka risks reinforcing a perception that its greatest constitutional certainty is uncertainty itself.
